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Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy∗
Nat Hansen
Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass
Abstract
There is a widespread assumption that ordinary language philosophy was killed
off sometime in the 1960s or 70s by a combination of Gricean pragmatics and the
rapid development of systematic semantic theory.1 Contrary to that widespread as-
sumption, however, contemporary versions of ordinary language philosophy are alive
and flourishing, but going by various aliases—in particular (some versions of) “con-
textualism” and (some versions of) “experimental philosophy”. And a growing group
of contemporary philosophers are explicitly embracing the methods as well as the title
of ordinary language philosophy and arguing that it has been unfairly maligned and
was never decisively refuted. In this overview, I will outline the main projects and
arguments employed by contemporary ordinary language philosophers, and make the
case that updated versions of the arguments made by ordinary language philosophers
in the middle of the twentieth century are attracting renewed attention.
1 Contemporary Ordinary Language Philosophy: Two Projects
In this overview I will discuss two projects that constitute contemporary ordinary language
philosophy: a constructive project and a critical project. Both are descendants of projects
pursued by “classic” (mid 20th-century) ordinary language philosophers. The constructive
project moves from observations about how certain words are used to facts about the mean-
ing of those words, and then draws conclusions about the “realities” those words are used to
∗Thanks to Zed Adams, Jonas A˚kerman, Avner Baz, Alex Davies, Aidan Gray, Jumbly Grindrod, Martin
Gustafsson, Eliot Michaelson, Chauncey Maher, an anonymous referee, and the editors Kathrin Glu¨er Pagin
and Peter Pagin for very helpful comments.
1See Chapman (2005, p. 3), Forguson (2001, p. 325), Parker-Ryan (2012), Soames (2003), Stanley (2008),
and Travis (1985). Even contemporary advocates of ordinary language philosophy recognize that it may
appear obsolete (Laugier, 2013, p. 9) and that there is a widely held belief that it is “seriously discredited”
(Baz, 2012b, p. 1).
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talk about. The constructive project is a continuation of J.L. Austin’s (1956, p. 8) practice
of using a “sharpened awareness of words” to “sharpen our perception of. . . the phenom-
ena”. The critical project involves arguing that philosophers produce “nonsense” or don’t
really understand what they are saying when they depart from or ignore the way language
is ordinarily used. Classic inspirations for the critical project include Wittgenstein’s (1969,
§10) remark that when one is sitting at a sick man’s bedside, looking attentively into his
face, neither the question “I know that a sick man is lying here?” nor the assertion “I don’t
know that there is a sick man lying here” makes sense and Austin’s (1962, p. 15) argument
that the word “directly” has been “stretched” by philosophers to the point that it has become
“meaningless”.
The constructive and critical projects in contemporary ordinary language philosophy
are separable: one can engage in the constructive project without thinking that philoso-
phers are prone to produce nonsense when they depart from ordinary language, and one
can engage in the critical project and not draw any conclusions about extra-linguistic re-
ality from the way people ordinarily speak (Baz’s 2012b “essentially responsive” way of
conducting ordinary language philosophy pursues this latter approach, for example).
There is a long tradition of criticizing versions of these two projects as they were de-
veloped by classic ordinary language philosophers. I will argue that some of the standard
objections to classic ordinary language philosophy can be met, and that, while there remain
reasonable objections to the contemporary versions of both of these projects, contemporary
ordinary language philosophers pursue these projects in ways that are worthy of serious
consideration.
2 The constructive project
The constructive project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy involves moving
from observations about the ordinary use of philosophically significant expressions (e.g.,
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“knows”) to conclusions about non-linguistic aspects of the world (the nature of knowledge,
e.g.).2
The constructive project has an initial semantic stage that is followed by a metaphysical
stage. The semantic stage aims to establish conclusions about the meaning of an expression
on the basis of facts about how the expression is ordinarily used. The metaphysical stage
aims to establish conclusions about the nature of what the target expression refers to on the
basis of the meaning of the expression.
Semantic Stage
1. An expression “X” is ordinarily used in way Y.
2. The best explanation of the fact that “X” is ordinarily used in way Y requires the
semantics (“linguistic meaning”) of “X” to have feature(s) F.
Metaphysical Stage
3. Semantics constrains metaphysics: If the semantics of “X” has feature(s) F, then the
nature of what “X” refers to—X—will have feature(s) G.
Each element of the constructive project has been intensely disputed from the heyday of
classic ordinary language philosophy up to the present day.
2.1 Drawing Conclusions about Meaning from Observations about Ordinary Use
A standard worry about classic ordinary language philosophy is that it fails to recognize that
conclusions about the meaning of an expression do not follow directly from observations
about the ordinary use of that expression. This worry dates back at least to Grice (1961),
2For discussion of the linguistic components of epistemological contextualism and how it is supposed to
bear on metaphysical issues, see Ludlow (2005). Stanley’s (2011a,b) and Stanley and Williamson’s (2001)
linguistic arguments for intellectualism about knowledge how have also been compared to ordinary language
philosophy (though their arguments rely more on the details of one type of syntactic theory than on how
language is ordinarily used). For discussion, see Abbott (2013), Chalmers (2012), and Noe¨ (2005, p. 286).
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who defends sense-data-based theories of perception against the attacks of ordinary lan-
guage philosophers by criticizing them for failing to recognize that conclusions about the
meaning of “looks” and related expressions do not follow directly from observations about
the ordinary use of those expressions.3 I’ll discuss one version of this worry before going
on to describe an example of how contemporary ordinary language philosophers respond
to it.
Consider the following skeptical argument schema:
1. You can’t rule out the possibility that you’re dreaming that P .
2. If you can’t rule out the possibility that you’re dreaming that P , then you don’t know
that P .
3. So you don’t know that P .
For almost all values for P , it doesn’t seem possible to rule out the possibility that one is
dreaming that P . If we accept premise 2 in the skeptical argument (for almost all values for
P ), then we have to conclude that there is almost nothing that we know. That conclusion
is startling, and seems to conflict with the fact that we are ordinarily happy to attribute all
kinds of knowledge to people who haven’t ruled out the possibility that they are dreaming.
Austin (1946) observes that we ordinarily attribute knowledge to someone just in case
they are able to rule out reasonable alternatives to what she claims to know (where an
alternative to a proposition P is a proposition that implies the falsity of P ).4 For example, to
know that the bird in the garden is a goldfinch, one has to be able to rule out the alternative
3Grice’s (1989) criticism of “A-philosophy” raises this worry about a variety of expressions, including
“remember”, “seeing. . . as”, “voluntary” and “trying”. Travis (1985) defends central elements of ordinary
language philosophy against Grice’s criticisms of “A-philosophy”. For contemporary examples of Grice’s
criticism, see, e.g., Bach (2007), Kauppinen (2007, p. 104) and Soames (2003, Ch. 9). For a response to these
contemporary versions of the worry, see Baz (2012b, Ch. 1).
4Lawlor (2013) develops an Austin-inspired “reasonable alternatives” theory of knowledge that is “a
species of the genus relevant alternatives theory” (p. 74). For examples of relevant alternatives theories
see Dretske (1970), Goldman (1976) and Stine (1976).
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that the bird in the garden is a woodpecker. One might be able to do that by observing that
the bird in the garden has eye-markings characteristic of goldfinches (but not woodpeckers).
In an ordinary birdwatching situation, no one would count the fact that the person who
claims to know that there’s a goldfinch in the garden hasn’t ruled out the alternative that
what she takes to be a bird is in fact a stuffed goldfinch (or the alternative that she is
dreaming that there is a goldfinch in the garden) as disqualifying her as knowing that there’s
a goldfinch in the garden.
Do Austin’s observations about how we ordinarily use “knows” pose a challenge to
the skeptical argument? If we assume that ordinary use tells us directly what “knows”
means, then premise 2 in the skeptical argument looks like it involves a distortion of the
meaning of “knows”— premise 2 sets far higher standards for knowledge ascriptions than
we ordinarily require. And if the skeptical argument involves a distortion of the meaning
of “knows”, then it doesn’t really have the startling conclusion that it initially seemed to
have—that we can’t know many of the ordinary things we take ourselves and others to
know.
But there is an influential argument that there is no direct inference from how an expres-
sion is ordinarily used to what that expression means, because “there are two apparently
distinct questions that can be asked about what someone says. We can ask whether it is
true, or we can ask whether it was appropriately or reasonably said” (Stroud, 1984, p. 57).
There needs to be some additional reason to think that facts about ordinary use should be
explained by facts about the meaning of an expression rather than facts of some other type,
such as facts about when the expression can be appropriately asserted (Searle 1969, §6.3;
Stroud 1984, pp. 62–63). Unless some such reason is forthcoming, then it doesn’t follow
that the second premise in the skeptical argument involves a distortion of the meaning of
“know”.5
5Stroud (1984, p. 75 n. 17) says that his argument is indebted to Grice. Kaplan (2000) criticizes Stroud’s
separation of truth and acceptability.
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The constructive project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy takes on this
challenge by first agreeing that there is no direct relation between the ordinary use of an ex-
pression and the meaning of that expression but then attempting to give additional reasons
in favor of thinking that facts about the ordinary use of an expression provide evidence of
the meaning of that expression. Premise 2 in the semantic stage of the constructive project
marks this important difference between classic and contemporary forms of ordinary lan-
guage philosophy: it is now widely recognized that any inference from how an expression
is ordinarily used to the meaning of that expression will have to be an inference to the best
explanation.
For example, DeRose (2005, 2009, Ch. 2) argues for contextualism about knowledge
ascriptions—the view that the semantic content of “S knows that p” can vary in differ-
ent contexts—on the grounds that it best explains truth-value and acceptability judgments
about the ordinary use of knowledge ascriptions.6 DeRose is aware that he needs to respond
to a challenge of this type in order to support his claim that it is a semantic feature about
“S knows that p”—namely, that it can vary its (semantic) content in different contexts—
that best explains the data from ordinary use. The “warranted assertibility objection” to
semantic versions of epistemic contextualism claims that the patterns in ordinary use that
the contextualist takes to support a semantic conclusion—namely, that what is said by uses
of “S knows that p” is judged true and appropriate in certain (“low standard”) contexts, and
what is said by “S doesn’t know that p” is judged true and appropriate in certain (“high
standard”) contexts—can best be explained in terms of non-semantic facts about when it
is conversationally appropriate to say “S knows/doesn’t know p”. There is a lively debate
concerning whether contextualists can convincingly respond to the warranted assertibility
6DeRose (2009, p. 47) writes: “The best grounds for accepting contextualism come from how knowledge-
attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, non-philosophical talk: What ordinary
speakers will count as ‘knowledge’ in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others”.
See Hansen (2012) for criticism of the experimental method DeRose uses to gather his ordinary language
data. Baz (2012b) argues that the contexts that contextualists employ in their experiments are not ordinary
contexts, and so do not provide genuine evidence of ordinary use.
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objection and other types of pragmatic explanations of the data from ordinary use (see,
e.g., Brown 2006, Davis 2007, DeRose 2009, Ch. 3, Rysiew 2001, and Stainton 2010 for
discussion and debate).
There are significant disagreements about what features the meaning of expressions
need to have in order to explain patterns of ordinary use, even among contemporary philoso-
phers who say they are doing ordinary language philosophy (DeRose 2009, p. 51 and Travis
1989, p. 155, for example). DeRose’s epistemological contextualism is compatible with
standard (Kaplanian) semantic theories of how meaning and context interact.7 Standard
theories treat the meaning of linguistic expressions as a function from contextual parame-
ters (like time, location, speaker, etc.) to contents (extensions). That captures the way in
which expressions like “I” and “now” have a linguistic meaning that remains fixed, while
the things those expressions are used to refer to systematically vary depending on partic-
ular features of the context (who the speaker is for “I” and what the time is for “now”,
e.g.). DeRose’s contextualism is a modest extension of the standard theory from obviously
context sensitive expressions like “I” and “now” to the expression “knows”, according to
which the word “knows” can vary its content depending on what the relevant epistemic
standards are.
While DeRose pursues a version of the constructive project in contemporary ordinary
language philosophy within the framework of standard semantic theory, Travis (1978, 1981,
1989, 2008) rejects the idea that ordinary use can be explained in terms of systematic rela-
tions between the meaning of linguistic expressions and particular contextual parameters.
According to Travis’s “occasion-sensitive” view, once one appreciates the variety of things
an expression can be used to say, the task of identifying an informative and non-ad-hoc set
of contextual parameters on which the content of an expression depends looks hopeless.
What a sentence is used to say or what an expression is used to refer to on a particular
7See DeRose (2009, p. 3) and Kaplan (1989).
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occasion is fixed by a “correct understanding” of the use of that expression on an occasion,
and a correct understanding of the use of an expression on an occasion is how a “reason-
able judge” would understand it. Reasonableness, and hence also correct understanding, is
not equivalent to an appreciation of some specific set of contextual parameters. So the lin-
guistic meaning of an expression should not be understood—as it is on the standard theory
of how meaning and context interact—as a function from some specific set of contextual
parameters to an extension. Travis’s version of the constructive project might therefore be
regarded as a closer continuation of the spirit of classic ordinary language philosophy than
DeRose’s in the respect that it aligns with the classic idea that the resources of systematic
semantic theory are ill-suited for explaining ordinary use because “ordinary language has
no exact logic” (Strawson, 1950, p. 344).8
While there are deep disagreements about how best to explain the way expressions are
ordinarily used, contemporary ordinary language philosophers are not prone to make the
direct inference from the ordinary use of an expression to the meaning of that expression
that classic ordinary language philosophers have been criticized for.
2.2 How are Expressions Ordinarily Used?
In his criticism of the direct move from the ordinary use of “knows” to the meaning of
“knows”, Stroud grants the data that Austin cites about ordinary use. But another objection
to classic ordinary language philosophy disputes Premise 1 in the constructive project, by
challenging the legitimacy of the data the project is based on. Mates (1964) (originally
published in 1958) argues that ordinary language philosophers employ unreliable methods
when collecting data about how we ordinarily use expressions, and he cites the fact that
there isn’t agreement about how the word “voluntary” is ordinarily used even among ad-
vocates of ordinary language philosophy as evidence that the facts about ordinary use are
8Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing how Travis is more closely related to classic ordinary
language philosophy than other contemporary philosophers who are engaged in the constructive project.
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murkier than classic ordinary language philosophers assume.
Buckwalter (2010) and Feltz and Zarpentine (2010) are contemporary examples of a
Mates-style challenge to the contextualist’s constructive ordinary language project in epis-
temology.9 Mates, Buckwalter, and Feltz and Zarpentine all argue that existing armchair
methods of gathering data about the ordinary use of knowledge ascriptions are inadequate,
but their contemporary versions of Mates’s challenge involve experiments that fail to con-
firm the claims that contextualists and “anti-intellectualists” make about the ordinary use of
knowledge ascriptions. The experimental challenge to armchair methods of collecting data
about ordinary use is part of a much larger trend of skepticism about armchair methods of
collecting data in both linguistics and philosophy.
But in a more recent experimental investigation of the armchair judgments made by
contextualists, Hansen and Chemla (2013b) confirm contextualists’ judgments about “know”,
color terms, and other expressions. This finding comports with recent experimental inves-
tigations in linguistics showing that experts’ armchair judgments about the acceptability
of variety of examples align with the judgments of ordinary speakers in experimentally
controlled circumstances (Sprouse et al., 2013), and that there is consistency between the
judgments of expert linguists and non-specialists who have some familiarity with cognitive
science (Culbertson and Gross, 2009).10 The recent experimental turn in how philosophers
collect and analyze linguistic data has therefore provided both a means of renewing Mates’s
challenge and the tools for defenders of ordinary language philosophy to answer it.
9As DeRose (2011, p. 91) points out, though Feltz and Zarpentine don’t take themselves to be presenting
a challenge to contextualism, but to “anti-intellectualism” (a form of invariantism about “knows”), their study
nevertheless still seems to pose a challenge to contextualism.
10For discussion of these and related studies, and an overview of empirical and conceptual issues bearing
on the role of intuitions as evidence for linguistic theory, see Maynes and Gross (2013).
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2.2.1 An alternative conception of statements about “ordinary use”
These contemporary debates about the reliability of ordinary language philosophers’s meth-
ods of collecting evidence of how expressions are used assume, with Mates, that the stan-
dards for evaluating statements about ordinary use are those appropriate for evaluating
descriptive statements, and with Fodor and Katz (1963, p. 71) that claims about ordinary
use “should be subject to the same modes of confirmation and disconfirmation that linguists
accept”.
Cavell (1964) (originally published in 1958) rejects the assumption that the statements
of ordinary language philosophers are subject to the same standards as the statements of
empirical linguists. Cavell claims that statements about ordinary use made by ordinary
language philosophers are “categorial declaratives”, which are like descriptions of the rules
of games that “tell us how an action is done, or how it is to be done” (p. 94). For example,
Cavell says that a statement like “‘I know it’ is not (ordinarily) said unless the speaker has
great confidence in it” (p. 87) sometimes “sounds less like a descriptive statement than a
rule”. Cavell thinks that the “categorial”, rule-giving, function of such statements about
ordinary use has been overlooked.11
As Bates and Cohen (1972) observe in relation to Cavell’s views about ordinary lan-
guage, “explicating Cavell is no picnic”, but recent work on what has been called “concep-
tual ethics” provides an alternative way of seeing how statements about ordinary language
might differ from the claims made in empirical linguistics. Conceptual ethics concerns
the general question “how should we use our words?”, which can arise in many different
particular forms, including “resolving ambiguity, precisifying a vague term, setting a con-
textual parameter, or in any other way determining how some antecedently indeterminate
11For attempts to explicate Cavell’s approach to ordinary language philosophy, see Gustafsson (2005) and
Hammer (2002, Ch. 1). Jackman (2001) critiques “conventionalist” attempts (Searle, 1969; Vendler, 1967)
to explain how statements about ordinary language are different from the claims made by an empirical lin-
guist. Sandis (2010) argues that ordinary language philosophy is interested in “objective facts about linguistic
norms” and not in the regularities of use that experimental philosophers and linguists uncover.
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matter of meaning should be settled” (Plunkett and Sundell, 2013, p. 3).12
If the statements made by ordinary language philosophers are understood not as at-
tempts to give an empirically adequate description of some antecedently settled meaning
of an expression, but as attempts to fix or push a particular precisification or expansion of a
meaning for some purpose, then the standard charge that their methods of empirical verifi-
cation are not up to professional standards in linguistics are missing the point. For example,
it might be worthwhile to see Austin’s (1966) discussion of subtle distinctions between the
meaning of “intentionally” and “deliberately” not as a recording of pre-existing distinctions
between the ordinary use of those expressions, but as an attempt to fix those expressions
to subtly different concepts with the aim of providing us with more precise linguistic tools
to work with in discussions of action and responsibility.13 This way of thinking of ordi-
nary language philosophy, however, involves a substantial departure from the constructive
project because its aim is not to discover distinctions that are present in ordinary use, but
to revise ordinary use for certain purposes.14
2.3 The Metaphysical Stage of the Constructive Project
Most of the argumentative weight in contemporary ordinary language philosophy is fo-
cused on the semantic stage in the constructive argument. It is difficult enough to make a
convincing case that the meaning of a particular expression has some particular semantic
feature(s) F, and the further step of drawing conclusions about the nature of some aspect of
12Chalmers (2012, pp. 10–11) points out the relevance of “what expressions ought to mean” for contempo-
rary ordinary language philosophy. For an outline of conceptual ethics, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013a,b).
13Interpreting Austin as aiming at giving empirically adequate descriptions of how expressions are actually
used runs into the difficulty that he would be mistaken about some of his central cases, including ordinary
judgments about “intentionally” and “deliberately”. See Hansen and Chemla (2013a) for experimental evi-
dence to that effect.
14Jackman (2001, p. 322) raises a similar worry about attempts to understand ordinary language philoso-
phers as proposing how we should use our words. And see Wilson (2006) for a view that shares some
sympathies with the objectives of ordinary language philosophy (see pp. 18–19, e.g.) but which holds that
our “linguistic training” in ordinary use “has not prepared us adequately for dealing with a vexatious world”
(p. 19) and can lead us astray in various circumstances.
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non-linguistic reality on the basis of that meaning adds another level of complexity to the
constructive argument. Some theorists explicitly refrain from drawing any metaphysical
conclusions from the semantic facts. Bach (1986, p. 573) says, for example, that in doing
semantics for natural languages one is engaged in “natural language metaphysics”, which
involves trying to answer the question “what do people talk as if there is?”, but which does
not try to answer the traditional metaphysical question: “What is there?”15
But some contemporary philosophers maintain that the semantic facts about “knows”
(e.g.) should constrain accounts of the non-semantic facts (about knowledge, e.g.). For
example, Ludlow (2005, p. 13) says
any investigation into the nature of knowledge which did not conform to some
significant degree with the semantics of the term “knows” would simply be
missing the point. . . epistemological theories might be rejected if they are in
serious conflict with the lexical semantics of “knows”.
Why should the semantics of “know” constrain the metaphysics of knowledge? If we as-
sume that the semantics of an expression like “knows” captures the ordinary understanding
of knowledge, then the following argument gives one motivation for wanting such a con-
straint:16
1. If we want our philosophical theories (of knowledge, e.g.) to address the concerns
that led us to philosophical investigation in the first place, then they need to be about
the relevant objects of investigation as they are “ordinarily understood outside of
strictly philosophical discourse”. (Alexander and Weinberg, 2007, p. 58)
2. We do want our philosophical theories (of knowledge, e.g.) to address the concerns
that led us to philosophical investigation in the first place.
15Pelletier (2011) argues that nothing about the nature of “reality” follows from the semantics of mass and
count terms.
16The semantics of “knows” might not capture the ordinary understanding of knowledge, if, e.g., there are
good reasons to embrace a “minimalist” account of semantic content. See Borg (2004, 2012).
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3. So our philosophical theories need to be about the relevant objects of investigation
(knowledge, e.g.) as they are ordinarily understood outside of strictly philosophical
discourse.17
Whatever appeal the preceding argument has does not extend to scientific or technical
matters like tautology or connectionist theories of mind, because there is no reason to
think that ordinary understanding should impose any constraints on how those matters are
understood (Knobe and Nichols, 2008, p. 8; Alexander and Weinberg, 2007, n. 7). It is
limited to those topics that ordinary speakers regularly deal with, like whether someone
knows something, or whether someone is responsible for doing something or not.
One worry about the argument is that it doesn’t allow for the possibility that the concern
that leads us to philosophical investigation is to understand the topic, whatever it turns
out to be. It may turn out that in the course of philosophical theorizing about knowledge
(e.g.) that we discover good reasons to refine our ordinary understanding of the topic.
For example, Hazlett (2010, p. 500) has argued that there is reason to think that the “best
candidate to serve as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary talk” is non-factive (in order to
explain the acceptability of sentences like “Everything he knows is wrong”), while the type
of knowledge that is of genuine interest in epistemology is factive.18
One might instead argue that semantics constrains metaphysics if one accepts that se-
17See Knobe and Nichols (2008, pp. 8–9) for a related argument. Hanfling (2000, p. 235) argues that the
ordinary meaning of “meaning” should constrain permissible theories of what meaning is (the argument is
directed against Putnam’s externalist theory of natural kind terms).
18See Stokke (2013) for criticism of Hazlett’s argument that “knows” in ordinary language is non-factive.
Abbott (2013) argues that evidence from cognitive psychology about functional differences between declar-
ative and procedural memory threatens Stanley’s (2011) argument that the semantics of “knows how to”
provides convincing evidence in support of an “intellectualist” theory of knowledge-how. Also relevant here
is Carnap’s (1956, §2) conception of “explication”, which involves “making more exact a vague or not quite
exact concept used in everyday life. . . or rather of replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept”.
Carnap gives as examples of fruitful explications Frege and Russell’s replacement of the “not quite exact
meaning” that the term “two” has in everyday life with the concept of the class of pair-classes and the re-
placement of the “concept of truth as used in everyday language” with the semantical concept of truth (p. 8).
It might turn out, in other words, that in the course of philosophical theorizing we discover that the meanings
of the ordinary expressions that we began the investigation with can’t do the precise work we need them to
do and we have to create more refined semantic tools.
13
mantic theories are in the business of stating truth conditions for declarative sentences of
natural languages (Chalmers 2012, pp. 4–5 calls this the “disquotational argument”).19
Such a semantics would generate truth conditions like the following:
“S knows that P” is true iff S has ruled out all of the reasonable alternatives to P.
But given that truth is disquotational (i.e., “S knows that P” is true iff S knows that P), the
truth condition for “S knows that P” would entail the following:
S knows that P iff S has ruled out all of the reasonable alternatives to P.
Which is a claim about the conditions under which S knows that P (i.e. a claim about the
metaphysics of knowledge). So if semantics involves stating truth-conditions, then given
the disquotational nature of truth, it entails metaphysical commitments.20
The tight connection that exists between truth conditional semantics and metaphysics
means that if there are reasons to reject a particular metaphysical theory of, e.g., knowl-
edge, then those are also reasons to reject the corresponding semantics of “knows”. If on
the correct theory of knowledge we turn out not to know many of the things we ordinarily
take ourselves to know, then the meaning of “knows” will be different from what we ordi-
narily take it to be, for example. That is, metaphysics constrains semantics just as much as
semantics constrains metaphysics. As Ludlow (2005, p. 13) puts the idea:
Our task as investigators then is to solve a kind of complex equation in which
we have partial information from linguistic theory, partial knowledge from our
reflective analysis of knowledge, and we must find a way to balance the equa-
tion.
19See Gross (2006) for a much more in-depth exploration of this issue than is possible here.
20Thanks to Aidan Gray for this way of putting the argument. An anonymous referee points out that
disquotationality only holds when there are no context sensitive expressions on the left hand side of the
biconditional. Given that epistemic contextualists are committed to the context sensitivity of “knows”, the
disquotational argument won’t be usable by contextualists.
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Thinking of semantics and metaphysics as interdependent is compatible with Austin’s
(1956) conception of ordinary language as the “first word” in philosophical investigations:
because it evolves under the pressures of practical projects and interests, there is reason
to look to ordinary language as a repository of distinctions that are richer than those that
philosophers will be able to “think up in an armchair of an afternoon”. On this understand-
ing, we can depart from or revise ordinary language “if our interests are more extensive
or more intellectual than the ordinary”. But consulting ordinary language, in certain areas
where ordinary language is rich with distinctions (one of Austin’s examples of such an
area was excuses), is a way of avoiding oversimplification and a technique for discovering
aspects of reality that may otherwise go unnoticed.
3 The critical project
Classical ordinary language philosophy is standardly understood as accusing its philosoph-
ical opponents of not merely offering theories that are false, or of making arguments that
are unsound, but of saying things that are nonsensical or meaningless because they stray
from the ordinary use of the expressions involved.21 Malcolm (1951, p. 337) says that the
“natural usage” of the sentence “I am here” is to reply to the question “Where are you?”.
A philosopher who wants to cite “I am here” as an example of a piece of “absolutely cer-
tain knowledge” (or a sentence that is true in virtue of the logic of demonstratives, as in
Kaplan (1979, p. 82)), however, has “fallen into nonsense”, because she is attempting to
use the sentence in a way that has “broken away” from the ordinary use that is made of the
sentence.
This kind of argument is subject to two of the objections discussed in relation to the
constructive project: First, it relies on questionable data about the way that “I am here” is
21Sensitive exegetical work on classical proponents of ordinary language philosophy challenges this stan-
dard understanding. See, for example, Conant (1998) and Cavell (1979, p. 192). Thanks to Martin Gustafsson
for emphasizing this point.
15
ordinarily used. Certainly “I am here” is used in the way Malcolm describes, but is that its
only use?22 Second, it is subject to the worry that classic ordinary language philosophers
move too quickly from observations about ordinary use to conclusions about the meaning
of linguistic expressions.23
Is there any hope for a contemporary version of the critical project? Baz (2012b,a)
makes the case that there is. Focusing on the expression “know that” (and cognates), Baz
argues that questions posed by philosophers about the meaning of particular expressions
(which Baz calls instances of “the theorist’s question”) are “fundamentally different from
any question to which we might need to consider as part of our everyday employment of
these expressions” (p. 91). Ultimately he aims to establish that not only is the theorist’s
question fundamentally different from everyday questions, but also to raise the possibility
that, insofar as it lacks a connection to any of the ordinary purposes that one might have in
asking whether someone knows something, we may be “tempted to think we understand”
the theorist’s question when we in fact do not (p. 123).
Baz’s primary target is Williamson (2004, 2005, 2007), who defends a type of arm-
chair philosophical methodology against recent attacks from experimental philosophers.
Williamson denies that what goes on when philosophers ask whether a concept applies to
some imagined or real situation should involve eliciting intuitions as to whether or not the
concept applies, where those intuitions are evidence that the concept applies or does not.
That kind of approach both invites unnecessary investigations into whether or not philoso-
phers’ intuitions are widely shared and into how we could know that they are reliable
indications of the subject matter under investigation, and it unnecessarily psychologizes
the evidence available to philosophers. Instead, Williamson holds that when philosophers
22Malcolm allows that “there are other related usages”, but does not discuss them.
23In the midst of making the argument that “I am here”, used by the philosopher as an example of a piece of
absolutely certain knowledge, is nonsense, Malcolm says “The sentence ‘I am here’ came to be used because
its utterance served a certain purpose—namely, to inform someone of our whereabouts. Its meaning lies in
this usage” (p. 337).
16
ask whether a concept or expression applies to some imagined or real situation they are
exercising our everyday capacity to apply concepts to actual and counterfactual situations
(Williamson 2005 p. 12, 2007 p. 188). Insofar as that everyday capacity is reliable, the
application of concepts to or use of expressions to describe imagined or real cases in phi-
losophy should be reliable as well.
If Baz is right that the theorist’s question is fundamentally different from everyday
questions, then Williamson’s defense of his armchair methodology, which ties the relia-
bility of our answers to the theorist’s question to the reliability of our everyday capacity
to apply concepts to encountered situations, fails.24 Baz aims to establish the existence of
a fundamental difference between “the theorist’s question” about knowledge and ordinary
questions about knowledge by arguing for the following two claims:
1. The capacity to understand and competently answer everyday questions is essentially
the capacity to see and properly respond to what may be called ‘their point’—the
particular human interest of which they are expressive.
2. ‘The [philosopher’s] question has no point, in the relevant sense; it invites us to
apply our words to some given case apart from any non-purely-theoretical interest
that anyone might have in that case’ (p. 105)
Baz’s approach to supporting (1) and (2) is to work through an extensive list of exam-
ples of what we are doing ‘outside philosophy’ when we judge whether or not someone
knows something, and he makes the case that in ‘everyday’ (non-philosophical) conver-
sation, we never care about anything even resembling the bare (theorist’s) question that
arises in philosophical thought experiments.25 When we ordinarily want to know if some-
one knows, it’s always in the service of some other purpose: I may ask you if you know in
24The remainder of this section contains material from Hansen (2013).
25Compare Kaplan (1991), who argues against “a pure theory of justification. . . cleansed of the concerns
proper to the realm of the ordinary” (p. 154).
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order to see if you have some particular piece of information, or if you’re in a position to
offer an assurance that something is the case, etc. But none of those questions, Baz argues,
come to the same thing as the theorist’s question. He concludes that the philosopher’s ques-
tion about knowledge is fundamentally different from everyday questions about knowledge
because it is detached from whatever point there may be in asking whether someone knows
something in everyday conversation.
There are various ways that Baz’s argument can be resisted. One could argue that un-
derstanding and answering everyday questions does not always require seeing what the
point of asking them is. Or one could object that Baz’s survey of ordinary use isn’t ex-
tensive enough, and there is in fact some situation that could arise in a non-philosophical
conversation that is analogous to the theoretical question about knowledge that arises in
philosophical thought experiments. Both of those responses involve denying that there is
a fundamental difference between ordinary questions about knowledge and the theorist’s
question. Or one might grant that there is a fundamental difference between the way that a
word like ‘know’ is ordinarily used and the way that philosophers use it, but reject the idea
that this is a problem for philosophy. Some might even say that this is why we shouldn’t
ask ordinary, non-expert speakers for their judgments about philosophical cases.
Even if one does not accept Baz’s radical conclusion that the theorist’s question has
no point (in the sense of not being connected with any ordinary human interest), his ar-
gument cannot be ignored by those contemporary philosophers who invoke the responses
of “ordinary” speakers (e.g., contextualists, experimental philosophers), because there are
independent reasons to doubt that ordinary speakers reliably understand the questions they
are asked in experimental situations in the way philosophers do.
Baz’s critical project aligns with work in experimental psychology showing that differ-
ent senses of why a question is being asked can influence what is considered an appropriate
response. From the experimenter’s perspective, the point of asking certain questions may
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be obvious, but from the perspective of the participant it is easy to misunderstand what
the experimenter is asking. For example, Mercier (2011) argues that findings of apparent
intercultural variation in reasoning can be explained in terms of variation in how culturally
relevant the questions are to the participants. Participants’ understanding of experimental
settings can also systematically vary from that expected by the experimenter, which may
alter the interpretation of their responses (Hilton, 1995; Politzer, 2004; Schwarz, 1996).26
If the point of asking whether someone knows something in ordinary conversation dif-
fers systematically from the point of asking whether someone knows in the context of a
formal experiment or a philosophical thought experiment, that poses a problem for the
use of what ordinary speakers would say in support of—or as a way of challenging—
philosophical theories, because ordinary speakers may simply not understand the examples
in the way philosophers intend them to.
4 Conclusion
Reports of the death of ordinary language philosophy are greatly exaggerated. Philosophers
are engaged in intense debates about the three central elements of the constructive project
in contemporary ordinary language philosophy:
• what the data about the ordinary use of philosophically significant expressions like
“knows” are, and what the best methods for collecting such data are;
• what the best ways are to explain data about the way philosophically significant ex-
pressions like “knows” are ordinarily used;
• and what metaphysical significance (if any) the linguistic meaning of expressions
like “knows” has.
26See Cullen (2010) for an application of these worries to some work conducted by experimental philoso-
phers.
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The critical project has received less attention from contemporary philosophers, but if the
argument is convincing it poses an important challenge to standard methods of data col-
lection that rely on the judgments of ordinary speakers (that includes, ironically, the con-
structive project in contemporary ordinary language philosophy). Both those philosophers
who aim to challenge claims about the way expressions are ordinarily used (experimental
versions of Mates’s challenge discussed above, e.g.) and those who aim to support claims
about the way expressions are ordinarily used (by uncovering evidence that the judgments
of ordinary speakers in experimental tasks align with the judgments of philosophers, e.g.)
shouldn’t ignore Baz’s challenge: it is possible that by removing expressions from the sit-
uations in which they are ordinarily used and asking for responses to those expressions in
situations that have been systematically stripped of their connection to practical interests
and projects, philosophers are creating experimental artifacts rather than gathering data that
bears on the meaning of those expressions.27
Warnock (1998) writes that “the label ‘ordinary language philosophy’ was more often
used by the enemies than by the alleged practitioners of what it was intended to designate”.
But that is changing. A growing group of contemporary philosophers is willing to appro-
priate not just the methods of ordinary language philosophy, but the label as well, and the
debates those philosophers participate in are flourishing.
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